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Abstract 
On 27 May 2005, seven Member States signed the Prüm Convention to step up cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Named after 
the German city in which it was signed, the Treaty’s main advantage is that it enables the signatories to 
speed up the exchange of information. However, this paper argues that the Treaty produces negative 
externalities for the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice by circumventing the EU 
framework. First, by keeping the Convention under a multilateral umbrella, the signatories create a 
hierarchy within the EU. Second, by reverting to an intergovernmental arena, the European Parliament is 
ignored precisely at a time when it is achieving an increasingly central role in law-making in this field. 
As a result, Prüm weakens the EU more than it strengthens it, and under many circumstances, it simply 
cannot provide the way forward to the establishment of a manageable area of freedom, security and 
justice. 
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SECURITY AND THE TWO-LEVEL GAME: 
THE TREATY OF PRÜM, THE EU 
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THREATS 
THIERRY BALZACQ, DIDIER BIGO, SERGIO CARRERA & ELSPETH GUILD 
1. Introduction 
A certain tension prevails between the EU and intergovernmental processes in the area of 
security policy,
1 which is primarily manifested by challenges ‘from below’ by the Member 
States to the EU level. An excellent illustration of this phenomenon is the Treaty of Prüm,
2 
signed by seven EU Member States on 27 May 2005, in the German city of Prüm. The signatory 
states are Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. The 
objective of the Prüm Treaty
3 is to “further development of European cooperation, to play a 
pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation especially by means 
of exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration, while leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States of 
the European Union.”
4  
The method of Prüm is resolutely intergovernmental. Is this method useful to EU security as a 
whole? If not, is it the best way to enhance security? The main advantage, the signatories hold, 
is that Prüm will enable them to speed up the exchange of information. This paper argues, 
however, that Prüm is not a mere technical attempt to accelerate the flow of information among 
signatories. It is, fundamentally, a significant countervailing political force against the European 
Union’s area of freedom, security and justice. It weakens the EU more than it strengthens it, and 
under many circumstances, it simply cannot provide the way forward. For the most part much is 
lost and very little is gained by curtailing the EU framework. 
First, Prüm creates a hierarchy within the EU. In a word, if some Member States can decide to 
create a new structure that will apply to all, this produces a multiple-level game within the EU 
that will vitiate its credibility.  
Second, by focusing on data exchange, the Convention potentially creates competition with the 
‘principle of availability’ promoted by the Commission and foreseen in the Hague Programme 
of October 2005. In that initiative, the Commission proposed to substitute the principle that data 
belong to state authorities (subject of the law to protect the data subject) and can only be 
transmitted to another Member State on the conditions established by the state that holds the 
                                                 
1 See Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, Migration, Borders, Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU 
Policy, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2005; Joanna Apap and Malcolm Anderson, 
Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice in an Enlarged European Union, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2002. 
2 Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism, 
cross-border crime and illegal migration, Prüm (Germany), 27 May 2005, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 7 
July 2005, 10900/05. 
3 Throughout this paper, the terms Prüm Convention, Convention, Treaty of Prüm, Treaty and Schengen 
III are used interchangeably. 
4 Preamble to the Treaty of Prüm, p. 3. 2 | BALZACQ, BIGO, CARRERA & GUILD 
 
information with the ‘principle of availability’.
5 Under the latter principle, the authorities of any 
Member State would have the same right of access to information held by any other authority in 
the Union as applies to state authorities within the state where the data are held. Thus the 
element of the national settlement on the collection, retention and manipulation of data 
expressed in national constitutions is transformed into an EU-wide right of use of data. The 
national border is removed from the principle of data collection, retention and use.
6 By contrast, 
Prüm creates a database whose use is restricted to the seven signatories. Prüm institutionalising 
a new electronic border between the seven and the eighteen, the Treaty provokes a relapse of 
EU integration. 
The purpose of this working document therefore is to examine the extent to which Prüm 
undermines the process of Europeanisation, focusing on its goals and instruments. It is 
organised in three sections. The first of these draws upon the concept of Europeanisation to 
highlight the problems raised by the Treaty of Prüm. The Convention, we posit, adversely 
affects Europeanisation in so far as it curtails the power of EU institutions and restricts the 
development of security policy to some Member States. Section 2 examines the two axes around 
which the Treaty endeavours to organise cross-border action: terrorism and illegal migration.
7 
This section culminates in an investigation of the political and legal implications of data 
exchange, which is the core instrument of cooperation among signatories. It argues that the 
essential element of the Prüm Treaty is that it counters the principle of availability and provides 
that data remains the property of the state where it is collected. State authorities in other 
Member States have therefore no right to the data, only the right to request access. In this sense, 
Prüm recalibrates the relationship between the three actors involved in the transnational 
transmission of data, namely: the state that holds the data, the state that requests the data and the 
data subject. Finally, section 3 seeks to excavate the rationale of the Treaty through a contrasted 
approach to the transformation of the Schengen Convention.
8  
2.  Security and Europeanisation: Critical Reflections 
The initial aim of this section is to take stock of the problems raised by an approach to security 
outside of the EU framework. At the core of the Prüm Treaty is an opposition to the view, held 
by many, that the European level should be predominant in security-related debates.
9 We argue 
in this paper that the Convention of Prüm produces a political rift in the construction of the EU 
area of freedom, security and justice. Indeed, the fracturing of the legal framework of EU 
objectives and their pursuit through agreements that elude the EU and engage only a subset of 
                                                 
5 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information under the principle of 
availability, COM(2005) 490 final, Brussels, 12.10.2005. 
6 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information under the principle of 
availability, COM(2005) 490 final, Brussels, 12.10.2005. 
7 We do not deal with cross-border crime because Prüm itself has no title on this issue, although it 
includes a general chapter on “Other forms of cooperation” that addresses joint operation, measures in the 
event of imminent danger. None of these measures is fully developed, however. The only noteworthy 
measure is the possibility for officers to cross the border. Art. 25(1) states: “In urgent situations, officers 
from one Contracting Party may, without another Contracting Party’s prior consent, cross the border 
between the two so that, within an area of the other Contracting Party’s territory close to the border, in 
compliance with the host State’s national law, they can take any provisional measures necessary to avert 
imminent danger to the physical integrity of individuals.” 
8 Convention implementing the Schengen agreements of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. O.J. of the EC, 22.09.2000. 
9 See, for instance, Balzacq and Carrera, op. cit. and Anderson and Apap, op. cit. SECURITY AND THE TWO-LEVEL GAME | 3 
 
the parties is detrimental to EU integration. Thus, in order to understand the dynamics of the 
Prüm Convention, which as will be apparent covers a wide variety of heterogeneous subjects, it 
is critical to start with an investigation of the extent to which it affects the process of 
Europeanisation.
10  
The concept of Europeanisation provides a useful way to summarise the relationship between 
Member States and the EU level of policy-making. In general terms, Europeanisation is often 
taken to include how the policy business of EU impacts on the political system of Member 
States. In this context, Europeanisation is an intervening variable that describes: “Processes of 
(a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules. 
Procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of the EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policy.”
11 In short, the emphasis on the ‘incorporation’ of EU decisions suggests an essentially 
top-down approach to Europeanisation. Yet by failing to account for bottom-up practices, the 
top-down approach has made insufficient efforts to explicate how and when Europeanisation is 
effective. In fact, the real test of Europeanisation comes from specifying, empirically, how the 
internalisation of the EU’s ‘way of doing things’ enables and constrains Member States to act in 
accordance with EU patterns of governance.  
This assumption plays a crucial role in real world cases. For example, in the Prüm Convention 
the degree of Europeanisation impacts on deciding whether to act ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the EU 
framework. In this sense, the signatories do not value the EU as the primary unit for the 
production of security. The effect is to concentrate the decision power in the hands of a 
restricted number of Member States and sap the action of EU authorities that otherwise would 
be relevant. This happens as follows. 
The first and most paradoxical aspect of the preamble of the Treaty is how closely it is tied to 
the European Union. The very first line of the Treaty states: “the High Contracting Parties to 
this convention, being Member States of the European Union…” The qualifying characteristic 
of the parties is not their sovereign right to enter into treaties with other sovereign states but 
rather the limitation that they have voluntarily accepted to that sovereignty by virtue of their 
membership of the European Union. As Member States of the European Union, under the 
doctrine of the EC/EU treaties, the pursuit of objectives of the treaties, including and most 
importantly, in this context, the completion of the internal market and the area of freedom, 
security and justice, must take place within the treaties. Art. 10 EC requires the Member States 
to act in good faith to achieve the objectives of the treaty (and by extension all the EC/EU 
                                                 
10 The literature on Europeanisation is vast. A sample includes Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Europeanization 
of Citizenship?”, in M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001; Klaus H. Goetz, “National 
Governance and the European Integration: Inter-governmental Relations in Germany”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1995, pp. 91-116; Beate Kohler-Koch, “Catching up with 
Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 1996, pp. 359-380; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (eds), The Transformation of 
Governance in the European Union, London: Routledge, 1999; Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of 
Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, 
No. 1, 1994, pp. 69-88.   
11 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change”, 
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2004 (retrieved from 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000.008a.htm). 4 | BALZACQ, BIGO, CARRERA & GUILD 
 
treaties).
12 Thus, the room for manoeuvre as regards the conclusion of treaties among a small 
group of Member States or with third countries is highly circumscribed by the obligations to the 
EU that the Member States have accepted.  
The third preamble of the Treaty reinforces this impression stating “endeavouring, without 
prejudice to the provisions of the [EU and EC treaties], for the further development of European 
cooperation to play a pioneering role…” Thus it is apparent that the participating Member 
States are fully aware that the action they are taking by adopting the Prüm Treaty may be 
considered by some (including potentially the European Court of Justice) as inconsistent with 
their duties under the treaties.  
The preamble goes on to tell the reader that the treaty is intended “to play a pioneering role in 
establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation, especially by means of improved 
exchange of information” particularly in three fields, all of which are covered by provisions of 
the EU Treaty: combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal immigration. Because the 
signatories do not want to see their action dismissed, the preamble ensures that the treaty leaves 
‘participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States of the European Union.” In 
effect, the treaty proposes that this group of seven states will adopt the rules and practices for 
cooperation in these three fields and it will be open to other Member States to join in and follow 
the rules established by the seven if they so wish. In other words, the feeling that seven Member 
States wish to establish among themselves the rules and practices in the three fields without 
interference by the democratic and institutional structures of the EU or by other Member States 
is reinforced by the next preamble, which states “Seeking to have the provisions of this 
convention brought within the legal framework of the European Union”, and in Art. 1(4) Basic 
Principles of the Convention, which states “within three years at the most following entry into 
force of this convention, on the basis of an assessment of experience of its implementation, an 
initiative shall be submitted, in consultation with or on a proposal from the European 
Commission, in compliance with the provisions of the [EU/EC treaties], with the aim of 
incorporating the provisions of this Convention into the legal framework of the European 
Union”. 
3.  The Security Landscape of the Treaty of Prüm 
The Prüm Convention endorses the view that terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration 
are the central threats to the security of the signatories.
13 Threats faced by the seven Member 
States are thus assumed to be objective.
14 Positing objective threats is a political shortcut that 
introduces a dangerous simplification into the complexity of what constitutes a threat. Who 
decides, for instance, that a social problem is a terrorist act and what type of threat legitimates 
specific practices?
15 To put it differently, Prüm begins with the existence of security threats and 
seeks to model the response of signatories in explicit tools. In this section, we examine the 
political responses tailored to the problems identified. As we shall see, optimal security seems 
to depend on the level of density in the exchange of various kinds of data. This exchange, in 
                                                 
12 In the field of judicial cooperation and criminal matters, this demand hinges on the separation of 
powers and responsibilities between the First and Third Pillars. See for instance Case C-176/03, 
Commission v. Council of 13 September 2005.  
13 For a similar position, see European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
14 On the distinction between objective and subjective threats, see, inter alia, Thierry Balzacq, “Qu’est-ce 
que la sécurité nationale?,” La revue internationale et stratégique, Vol. 52, hiver 2003-2004, pp. 33-50. 
15 See ibid. and David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, 
No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-26. SECURITY AND THE TWO-LEVEL GAME | 5 
 
turn, creates the need to address the question of the interoperability of databases and data 
protection.
16  
3.1 Terrorism 
The ‘subjectivity’ inherent to the concept of terrorism has been often raised. And yet the Prüm 
Convention conflates categories (terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration) whose 
definition and demarcations are contentious.
17  
The ‘prevention’ and ‘combating’ of acts qualified as terrorist offences are presented by the 
Prüm Convention as the justification to adopt “the highest possible standard of cooperation by 
means of improved exchange of information”. The Convention provides the package of security 
measures in order “to prevent terrorist offences”. We highlighted two measures in particular: 
first, the supply of information in order to prevent terrorist offences and second, the deployment 
of air marshals. 
As regards the supply of information to prevent terrorist offences, Art. 16 of the Convention 
states that “for the prevention of terrorist offences” the Contracting Parties have the possibility 
to supply the other parties’ National Contact Points (NCPs) with the personal data and other 
information necessary because “particular circumstances give reason to believe that the data 
subjects will commit criminal offences”. Prüm offers the possibility to the States involved to 
carry out this activity even without being requested to do so by the other Contracting Parties. 
This logic of collecting information is not new. Indeed, a similar system of exchange of 
information aimed at combating terrorism took place within the context of the former ‘TREVI 
group’. Since 1976, this intergovernmental group managed to bring together Member State’s 
Ministers of Justice and Interior under each rotating Presidency to discuss terrorism. The fields 
covered by the different working groups expanded considerably during the 1980s to also cover 
organised crime, drugs and illegal immigration.  
The TREVI group represented the roots for the creation of the current and more sophisticated 
BdL (bureau de liaison) network.
18 The BdL network is at present the European Union’s official 
communication system connecting officials of the Member States in the Working Group on 
Terrorism. It was built in 1977 and since the mid-1990s it has been operated as crypto-email, 
designed for the transmission of information up to the ‘classified’ category. All 25 Member 
States are currently connected to the BdL system.
19  
The origins of this network may be found in the period following the summer of 2001, a time 
when the agenda of the Belgian Presidency of the EU was dominated by the security rationale. 
In effect, the Belgian Presidency reintroduced a procedure for rapid information exchange after 
acts of political violence.
20 On 17 September 2001, the Working Party Group on Terrorism at 
                                                 
16 This question was raised in Balzacq and Carrera, op. cit. 
17 For an analysis of how the conflation of categories may lead to human rights abuses, see ELISE Final 
synthesis report, November 2005.  
18 Didier Bigo, “Liaison Officers in Europe: New Actors in the European Security Field”, in James E. 
Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 67-100. 
19 See Council of the European Union, “Revised Action Plan on Terrorism”, 10694/05, Brussels 27 June 
2005. 
20 Council of the European Union, Rapid information exchanges on terrorist attacks, 10524/01, Brussels, 
17 September 2001. See also Council of the European Union, Initiative by the Kingdom of Spain for the 
adoption of a Council Decision introducing a standard form for exchanging information on incidents 
caused by violent radical groups with terrorist links, 5712/02, Brussels, 13 February 2002. 6 | BALZACQ, BIGO, CARRERA & GUILD 
 
the Council agreed that after the attacks in the US a “rapid information exchange on terrorist 
attacks” was highly necessary.
21 A standard form (a special bulleting form) to be sent through 
the BdL network was also agreed. The bulleting form is sent via the network of liaison offices, 
marked either ‘urgent’ or ‘flash’, as appropriate. The new rapid information exchange procedure 
aimed to have rapid and reliable information on terrorist attacks which occur in other Member 
States so that they can integrate this information in their respective assessment of the level of 
threat.  
The BdL network is of different nature and has different functions than the NCP system, as 
provided by the Prüm Convention. Indeed, under the new regime presented inside the 
Convention, the information and data exchange is about ‘suspects’ who may commit criminal 
offences. The BdL regime however mainly consists, at least formally, of exchange of 
information about ‘terrorist attacks’ which have already occurred in a particular Member State. 
Prüm goes further. It rearticulates and promotes this existing inter-exchange mechanism of 
transnational cooperation in the field of security. In fact, Art. 16 presents a number of 
problematic assumptions. To start with, this provision does not at all clarify how the contracting 
parties’ NCPs are going to generate ‘the knowledge’ that a particular person (i.e. suspect) will 
actually commit criminal offences in the future. Regardless, Prüm gives these new security 
authorities the right to transfer personal data and other wide information should they unilaterally 
decide that ‘somebody may become a terrorist’.  
More specifically, Art. 16 provides a detailed explanation of the kind of information that will be 
supplied. It rearticulates this provision and provides a more specific regime for the exchange of 
information relating the prevention of terrorist offences making reference to the EU legal 
framework. This substantially amplifies the provisions contained in the Schengen Convention 
which stipulates in Art. 46.1: “each Contracting Party may, in compliance with its national law 
and without being so requested, send the Contracting Party concerned any information which 
may be important in helping it combat future crime and prevent offences against or threats to 
public policy and public security.”
22 The Prüm Treaty adds more concrete reference to the 
exchange of “personal data and other information” and “in so far as is necessary because 
particular circumstances give reason to believe that the data subjects will commit criminal 
offences as referred to in the EU Council Framework Decision 2002/475).” 
Prüm therefore puts greater emphasis on the ‘prevention and visionary aspect’ exercised by the 
NCPs in the ‘fight against terrorism’. In this context, it comes as no surprise that the Convention 
makes reference to one of the core legal acts of the EU framework on the fight against terrorism, 
i.e. Framework Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002. This legal act calls 
for all the Member States to take the necessary measures at national level to ensure that the acts 
referred to in its Art. 1.1 are considered as ‘terrorist offences’. It is interesting to recall that in 
the decision-making process leading up to this Framework Decision, it was extremely 
complicated to reach a consensus among the Member States on a common definition of what 
‘terrorism’ is. As a consequence, the Member States defined this category in very broad terms 
including ‘causes’ as well as ‘intentions’ (i.e. threatening to commit any of the acts causing 
‘terrorism’). As Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet observes, the consequences of this definition and the 
inclusion of such an open-ended list of criminal offences which are incorrectly linked to 
                                                 
21 Council of the European Union, Working Party on Terrorism, Presentation of a Presidency initiative for 
the introduction of a standard form for exchanging information on terrorist incidents, 5712/02, Brussels, 
29 January 2002. 
22 Convention implementing the Schengen agreements of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. O.J. of the EC, 22.09.2000. SECURITY AND THE TWO-LEVEL GAME | 7 
 
‘terrorism’ are quite clear: any dissidence by any opposition group can be considered an ‘act of 
terrorism’ inside the European Union.
23  
The Convention endorses the controversial principles enshrined in the Council Resolution on 
security at European Council meetings and other comparable events.
24 Although Prüm does not 
refer to the resolution as such, Arts 13 and 14 of the Prüm Treaty are, we believe, firmly 
grounded on it. There, it discusses two ways in which Contracting Parties may prevent criminal 
offences and maintain public order and security in major international events: via the supply of 
non-personal and personal data. In effect, the data are supplied on the same weak grounds, i.e. 
under the terms of the Directive, “if there are substantial grounds for believing that they intend 
to enter the Member State with the aim of disrupting public order and security” or, expressed in 
the parlance of the Convention, Contracting Parties shall “supply one another with personal data 
if any final conviction or other circumstances give reason to believe that the data subject…poses 
a threat to public order and security.”
25 
Thus, with this emphasis on ‘beliefs’ and ‘intentions’, the Convention considers suspicion a 
legitimate rationale for transferring non-personal and personal data among the signatories. In 
short, what constitutes a ‘threat to public order’ is left unspecified. Furthermore, despite 
assertions to the contrary, what is being targeted here are individuals with identifiable behaviour 
associated, in turn, with identifiable political opinions. In other words, those who will be 
included in the databases are likely to be, as the 2002 Genoa demonstrations testify, political 
activists.
26 The legitimacy of such action is disputable. 
This calls attention to the implications of the creation of NCPs by the Contracting parties. The 
introduction of this network at the European level seems to follow the continuous demands 
made on several occasions by the Council. As a matter of fact, this was recommended in the 
Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime of 1997,
27 which stressed the need to establish NCPs in 
order to optimise transnational cooperation in the field of security. Further, the European 
Commission has stressed that “the national contact points should bring together, ideally in one 
office, the Europol National Units, the Sirene offices, customs, the Interpol NCB and 
representatives from the judicial authorities.”
28 In our view, the NCP should be subject to 
democratic control while carrying out the transnational competences conferred by the Prüm 
Convention. Otherwise, by implementing the provisions established in the Convention, each 
Contracting Party will have the possibility to create a national ‘oracle’ which will be in charge 
                                                 
23 Pierre-Emmanuel Guittet, “European Political Identity and Democratic Solidarity after 9/11: The 
Spanish Case”, Alternatives, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2004. 
24 See Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events, 29 
April 2004. 2004/C 116/06.  
25 Prüm, Art. 14 (1). Compare this with Art. 4 of the Council Resolution 2004/C 116/06: “The 
information supplied may concern names of individuals in respect of whom there are substantial grounds 
for believing that they intend to enter the Member State with the aim of disrupting public order and 
security at the event or committing offences relating to the event…” 
26 For a discussion of provisions on how suspicion affects the right of free movement in the EU, see 
Joanna Apap and Sergio Carrera, Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent State of 
Emergency in the EU?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 41, CEPS, Brussels, November 2003, pp. 6-7. For a 
detailed discussion of the effects of suspicion on politics and social relations, see Didier Bigo, “Suspicion 
et exception”, Cultures & Conflits. Sociologie politique de l’international, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005. 
27 Council Decision of 28 April 1997, OJ C 251/01. 
28 See Commission Communication “Enhancing Police and Customs Cooperation in the European Union: 
Report on Achievements since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,” COM(2004) 376 final, 
Brussels, 18.5.2004. 8 | BALZACQ, BIGO, CARRERA & GUILD 
 
of foreseeing if an individual will become a ‘terrorist’, and then transfer to the other Contracting 
parties all the information in relation to this ‘suspect’.  
Who is going to be the NCP in each Member State? Art. 16.3 establishes that “Each Contracting 
Party shall designate a national contact point for exchange of information with other 
Contracting Parties’ contact points. The powers of the national contact point shall be governed 
by the national law applicable.” Art. 19 further provides that “each Contracting Party shall 
designate a national contact and coordination point.” It will therefore be under the complete 
discretion of the states to decide the authority or authorities who will mutate into the category of 
NCP. There is more. The Convention is ambiguous as to whether, as under the principle of 
availability, there will be thematic NCPs (i.e. each dealing with one single issue) or a single 
NCP that deals with all types of data collected under the terms of Prüm.
29 Moreover, the nature 
of these agencies is not established. Here, too, the Treaty departs from the methodology chosen 
by the ‘principle of availability’ which requires Member States to restrict the use of data 
exchange to law enforcement authorities as well as for Europol officers, i.e. in theory, to police 
and custom services.
30 The fact that Prüm does not address this question makes us speculate that 
it will extend, as a general rule and not as an exception, the use of data exchange to secret 
services of signatories. 
As regards the sort of ‘data’ transferred, Art. 16 states quite clearly that it will comprise 
personal data and other information, such as surname, first names, data and place of birth and a 
description of the circumstances giving reason for the ‘belief’ that the person involved may 
commit a criminal act. Here the national contact points will have the possibility to give reasons 
why they fear that a particular individual is threatening, but this will not take place for the sake 
of accountability but as complementary information deemed necessary for ‘preventive 
purposes’.  
Moreover, the Convention does not specify the existence of conditions, limitations or 
requirements for the inclusion of a person/suspect (and his/her personal data plus other 
information) in this transnational system of data exchange. The only two requirements for the 
supply of personal information are that it has to be in compliance with national law and 
provided in individual cases. Further, the Convention states that “the supplying authority may, 
also having as basis national law, restrict or impose conditions to the use made of such data by 
the receiving authority”. The latter will be bound by these conditions.  
Here, the underlying assumption is that whatever circumstances are used to justify the transfer 
of personal data and information, they will be taken as ‘real’, i.e. unquestionable. This is 
disputable in a field rife with human rights concerns. Actually, the Explanatory Memorandum 
expressly mentions the observance (though not compliance) of the Convention with the rights 
provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union (which continues to be non-legally 
                                                 
29 COM(2005)490, Art. 4.1(b). Belgium has decided to use thematic NCPs, which does not necessarily 
mean that the other signatories will do the same. The Institut national de criminalistique et de 
criminologie, for example, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, will be the Belgian 
NCP for DNA data, and the Federal Police, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, will be the 
NCP for collecting and exchanging fingerprints, personal and non-personal data. See “Demande 
d’explications de M. Berni Collas au vice-premier ministre de l’Intérieur” sur ‘Le Traité de Prüm relatif à 
l’approfondissement de la coopération transfrontalière, notamment en vue de lutter contre le terrorisme, la 
criminalité transfrontalière et la migration illégale’ (n° 3-1246) (retrieved from 
http://www.senate.be/crv/3-145.html#_Toc125279214). 
30 COM(2005)490 final, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. Further, the Explanatory Memorandum 
provides that “The purpose of the action is to empower national law enforcement authorities and Europol 
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binding)
31 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).
32 In practice, however, human rights disputes might arise in relation to: 
1.  The right to respect private life (data protection), as recognised by Art. 8 of the ECHR and, 
equally protected by the Council Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data.
33 
2.  The possibility “for measures under this Convention to remain subject to suitable judicial 
review” – right to an effective remedy as stipulated by Art. 13 of the ECHR.  
The protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters has been the subject to a Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision 
published in October this year. This initiative acknowledges the lack of adequate safeguards and 
effective legal remedies for the transfer of data in the EU Third Pillar, and the need to ensure the 
strict observance of data protection in these areas of cooperation.
34 Prüm, however, weakens this 
initiative. Further, the power granted to the NCPs (‘security services’) may often lead to cases 
where their imagination, creativity and self-perception of threat may take predominance and 
lead to human rights disputes. This system does not offer any guarantees whatsoever that while 
the exchange of information takes place, data protection, as provided in the EU and European 
legal framework, will be respected. One question strengthens this concern: What is the 
democratic and judicial accountability against which these domestic authorities are subject? A 
minimalist answer is found in Art. 16: “the powers of the national contact point shall be 
governed by the national law applicable.” Thus, it will be for each Contracting Party to 
determine the conditions under which control and review of their actions will be undertaken.  
The second area covered by Chapter 3 of the Prüm Convention is the so-called ‘Air or sky 
marshals’. By ‘air marshals’, the Convention means “police officers or other suitably trained 
officials responsible for maintaining security on board aircraft”. The phrase “or other suitably 
trained officials responsible for maintaining security” is too broad and grants a wide room for 
action to the Contracting parties. This leaves a door open for the states to decide the authority 
that will carry out these functions. The possibility for the military or the private sector to get 
involved in this task is also critical regarding the accountability and democratic control of these 
armed security agents in planes. Art. 17 gives the power to the contracting States to decide for 
themselves to deploy ‘air marshals’ or ‘security escorts’ on aircraft registered in a contracting 
party. After 9/11, the US demands to arrange for armed air marshals to accompany some flights 
from the EU are well known. The introduction of this initiative was the subject of long 
discussions and raised serious concerns on grounds of liberty. It has also raised concerns as to 
the role of the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) and questions of competence as 
regards the deployment of air marshals.
35  
                                                 
31 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, 2000, OJ C-364/1, 7 December 2000. 
32 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome 
on 4 November 1950 
33 European Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281, 23 
December 1995, pp. 0031-50. 
34 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, COM(2005) 475 final, Brussels, 
4.10.2005.  
35 For a detailed analysis of the different actors involved in “security and air transport”, see Yann 
Poincignon, “Aviation civile et terrorisme: naissance et enjeux d’une politique européenne de sûreté des 
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Although the Scandinavian EU Member States in particular have been clearly opposed to this 
security measure, the Prüm signatories have taken this opportunity to provide a positive 
response to transatlantic security demands. Developing an air marshal programme among the 
seven Contracting states may have been considered the best solution in order to prevent the 
cancellation or disruption of flights to the US.
36 The Convention therefore provides, outside the 
EU dimension, a general agreement on ‘transport and aviation security’. Once again, this opens 
serious questions regarding the compatibility of the Convention with the principle of solidarity 
and good faith as inserted in the EC Treaty. It seems that the seven privileged States have 
chosen to disregard the current disagreement about this contested topic at EU level. It shows, 
too, how this sort of intergovernmental cooperation tends to be (mis)used to easily pass and 
agree on a series of policy measures that would be very difficult to reach agreement on under 
the EU framework. 
The only condition stated by the Convention for deployment of air marshals is to enact a written 
notice of their deployment at least three days before the flight in question. According to Annex 
1 of the Convention, the notice shall contain the following information: 1) Period of 
deployment, showing the planned length of stay, 2) flight details, 3) number of members of the 
air marshal team, 4) full names of all members, 5) passport numbers, 6) make, type and serial 
number of arms, 7) amount and type of ammunition and 8) equipment carried by the team for 
the purposes of its duties.  
The exception to that norm has been also inserted in Art. 17. The argument runs thus: “in the 
event of imminent danger, notice must be given without any further delay, as a rule before the 
aircraft lands”. But the concrete meaning and scope of ‘imminent danger’ is not explained by 
the Convention. We are now familiar with the political and media discourse which call for a 
‘permanent state of danger or emergency’. This argument may, in the future, provide the 
justification for a permanent deployment of air marshals. As we have witnessed in many other 
areas, the possibility for the ‘exception’ to become the norm is higher than some would have us 
agree. 
Finally, the Convention establishes a common training mechanism of assistance by which the 
contracting parties will assist one another in the training of air marshals. They will also 
cooperate closely on matters concerning ‘air marshals’ equipment’. In this regard, Art. 18 sets 
out the conditions for granting air marshals the permission to carry arms, ammunition and 
equipment. In particular, it provides that “the Contracting parties shall, upon request, grant air 
marshals deployed by other Contracting Parties general permission to carry arms, ammunition 
and equipment of flights to or from airports in Contracting Parties”. Some restrictions are 
nonetheless inserted in Paragraph 2. It specifies the conditions against which the carrying of 
arms and ammunition shall be subject to: 
1.  Those carrying arms and ammunition “may not” disembark with them from aircraft at 
airports or enter restricted-access security areas at an airport; 
                                                 
36 A similar critical response to the American pressure has been recently witnessed by the Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) and the introduction of biometric technologies in passports of EU citizens. The ECJ 
has ruled that the EU handover of passenger data to US authorities should be annulled. Opinion of 
Advocate general Leger Affaire 317/04 Parlement européen contre Conseil de l’Union européenne. On 
PNR, see Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data. On Biometric identifiers, see Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for visas and Regulation (EC) COM(2003) 0558 final-
CNS 2003/0218, and the Proposal for Council Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals, COM(2003) 0558 final-CNS 2003/0218, 
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2.  The arms and ammunition “must” be deposited for supervised safekeeping in a place 
designated by the competent national authority.  
3.2 Illegal  Immigration 
One of the key fields of cooperation of the Prüm Treaty is illegal migration. Chapter 4 of the 
Treaty, entitled Measures to combat illegal migration, provides the nuts and bolts which Prüm is 
intended to add to the existing EU acquis in the field. 
One of the key problems with EU action in this field is the lack of a definition that is not 
handicapped by complete circularity.
37 Thus when the EU comes to define illegal migration, the 
definitions invariably have recourse to national law. It is for national law to define who is illegal 
and what illegal migration is and those definitions, however formulated at the national level, are 
aggregated into a definition at the EU level. This way of arriving at a definition of illegal 
migration is highly unsatisfactory as it means that there is no common or external reference 
point against which the status of a particular individual can be determined to be regularly or 
irregularly present at any given time.  
This unsatisfactory state of affairs is compounded by an unfortunate tendency of EU institutions 
to make reference to illegal migration towards the EU, thus giving rise to the idea that one can 
determine illegal migration before an individual has arrived at a border. This is hard to embrace 
unless border officials are posted abroad and determining admission to the EU before the 
individual leaves a third country. Even then, the individual who is refused admission is not an 
illegal migrant as he or she has never even come close to the EU border which is central to the 
definition. 
The Prüm Treaty does not take us any further towards a viable definition of illegal migration. 
Yet it does seek to build on EU law regarding the operation of border officials outside the 
territory of the EU. Art. 20(1) provides that “on the basis of joint situation assessments and in 
compliance with the relevant provisions of […] Regulation 377/2004 […] on the creation of 
immigration liaison officers network, the Contracting Parties shall agree on the seconding of 
document advisers to States regarded as source or transit countries for illegal migration”. Three 
aspects of this provision bear reflection. First, in light of Art. 10 EC, the good faith obligation of 
the Member States, is it not questionable whether a small group of Member States can seek to 
act under the auspices of an EC Regulation but outside its scope? We think this constitutes: a) 
exclusion of the guardian of the treaties, the European Commission; b) disbarment of the 
European Court of Justice, which is responsible for interpreting EU law; d) circumvention of the 
European Parliament, which is entitled to co-decision in the adoption of legislation is this field 
and has battled long and hard to ensure that delegated powers even to the Council do not 
interfere with its prerogatives; and e) rather impractical in that the liaison officers of non-Prüm 
states are participating in the network and it would be rather difficult to determine when a 
liaison officer is acting under Prüm and when under the Regulation and thus engaging all the 
other liaison officers of the Member States or only those of the Prüm parties. 
Art. 20(3) provides that in seconding document advisers, the parties may entrust one of their 
number with specific coordination tasks. This is both legally and practically problematic as 
regards the liaison officers of the 25 and their entitlement to information under the Regulation 
                                                 
37 At best, there is a minimalist definition of who is illegally staying in the EU. The Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council COM(2005) 391 final of 1.9.2005 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals defines 
‘illegal stay’ as “the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third country national who does not 
fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions for stay or residence in that Member State.” Art. 3(b).  12 | BALZACQ, BIGO, CARRERA & GUILD 
 
against the exclusivity that is at the heart of Prüm, reserving extra information for only the 
participating few.  
The Treaty is quite specific about the role of the document advisers. Art. 21 provides that they 
have three main tasks: a) advising a party’s representatives abroad on passport and visa matters. 
b) advising and training carriers on detection of false documents and c) advising and training 
host country border control authorities and institutions. The intention that the contracting parties 
will develop a useful knowledge base that they will share only among themselves and exclude 
the other 18 Member States is rather offensive to the others. It is also clearly self-defeating. As 
five Member States are also full participants in the Schengen acquis (and it is expected that the 
new Member States, all of whom are excluded from Prüm, will be joining Schengen in 2007) 
but outside Prüm, their officials (who are not privy to the additional useful information) will 
continue to admit third country nationals whom the Prüm participants might consider to be an 
illegal migration risk. Once in the Union, these third country nationals will be entitled under EU 
law to free access to the whole of the territory of the Schengen 12, including all the Prüm states. 
Thus, it seems ambiguous to proceed down this route of privilege for some when the 
consequences of privilege are exactly zero because of the success of the completion of the 
internal market. 
Art. 23 provides for assistance with repatriation measures. Again, this area is the subject of a 
Council Decision (2004/573) and a Directive (2003/110).
38 Thus, all of the concerns expressed 
above about overlapping competence and lack of respect for Art. 10 EC are also valid as regards 
this article. The provision calls for the Prüm parties to assist one another with repatriation 
measures, including assistance in cases of transit. Participants shall inform one another of 
planned repatriation measures in good time and give the others a chance to participate. 
Arrangements for escort and security are to be agreed separately. Also repatriation via another 
party’s territory is to be resolved by negotiation in compliance with the law of the state through 
whose territory the repatriation is to take place. A working group is being established to assess 
results of operations and resolve problems. 
A new element arises in this section which is important – that is, the reference to the national 
law of the state through whose territory action is taken. The principle that is being inserted is 
that of retention of sovereignty by the Prüm states over activities of repatriation occurring on 
their territory. Contrary to some of the moves under consideration at the EU level to ensure that 
decisions of repatriation should have consequences across the common territory. This provision 
breaks up the common EU territory into its national constituent blocs once again for the purpose 
of determining the legality of repatriation. While this may be beneficial for a third country 
national who is being repatriated via a number of states – as he or she may counter the 
repatriation under the national law of each of them separately – it does not take EU integration 
much further. If anything, it will discourage any Member State planning repatriation via the 
territory of another party from pursuing such a route, as this is likely to be time consuming and 
fraught with difficulty. 
4.  The Logic and Implications of Data Exchange  
In the previous section, we have outlined the main threats that Prüm poses. We also alluded to 
the instruments (data exchanges) used by the signatories. We now turn our attention to the 
implications of these exchanges. 
                                                 
38 Council Decision of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for removals from the territory of 
two or more Member States, of third-country nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders; 
Council Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 November 2003 on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of 
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Member States have increasingly become advocates of data exchange to combat illegal 
migration, organised crime and international terrorism.
39 The Prüm Convention takes a similar 
approach. There are three principal actors involved in the transnational transmission of data: 1) 
The state that holds the data and which may or may not transmit them; for this state, the key is 
ownership of the data and the right to transmit to another state or not and under what conditions. 
2) The state that seeks data: under what conditions may the state require another state to provide 
data and what type of data can it require another state to provide? 3) The data subject: on what 
basis is the collection, retention and manipulation of data permissible (i.e. lawful); on what basis 
are the rights of the data subject regarding collection, retention and manipulation protected if 
data on him or her are transmitted to another state?  
The relationship of these three actors has been under increasing strain over the past few years in 
the material fields under consideration in the Prüm Treaty – terrorism, cross-border crime and 
illegal immigration. This is due, in part, to the fact the exponential development of technical 
capacities in respect of data has created possibilities that were not even dreamt of ten years ago. 
Data held by states on individuals have mushroomed in all these fields. As a consequence, states 
are intent on acquiring access to national data of their neighbours where it might aid their work 
against terrorism, cross-border crime committed by illegal migrants.  
These developments rest on the belief that data represent a form of knowledge that increases a 
state’s power. Thus, authorities that hold data are anxious to retain control over that data. 
However, in liberal democracies there is deep concern about the holding of personal data on 
citizens, which is expressed in the constitutions of many Member States as a right of the 
individual against the collection, retention or manipulation of personal data by state authorities 
except in those situations where specifically authorised. Thus, states are not only anxious to 
ensure that their own authorities correctly apply national rules on data but also that data on their 
citizens do not escape their control and risk being abused by other states. 
The interest of the Prüm Convention in data exchange constitutes an important element of its 
architecture. In other words, signatories partake of the view that data exchange will bring 
greater security to all. In practice, it aims to facilitate the trade of the following types of data: 
DNA profiles, fingerprints, vehicle registration, non-personal and personal data. The supply of 
these is carried out by a national contact point whose powers are governed by the national law 
of contracting parties. Rather than addressing all these instruments, let us spell out probably the 
most contested, namely: the transferring of DNA profiles. 
Clearly, Prüm pays special attention to the role of biometric identifiers in the transferring of 
data.
40 Among biometric identifiers, DNA has emerged as one of the most efficient if sensitive 
tools in criminal investigations. This lends credence to the idea that the establishment of 
national DNA analysis files and the automated searching and comparing of DNA profiles 
advance security throughout Europe. However, under the proposed ‘principal of availability’, 
the Prüm Convention is regarded as restricted in scope and content. For example, it does not 
contain the possibility to request telephone numbers and other communications data or 
ballistics. 
Indeed, the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information under 
the principle of availability widens the types of data collected.
41 In addition to DNA profiles, 
                                                 
39 See the debate between Charles Clarke and Alexander Alvaro in Parliament Magazine, No. 212, 
October 2005, pp. 46-49. 
40 On biometric and human rights, see Jillyanne Redpath, “Biometrics and International Migration”, 
International Migration Law, No. 5, 2005; Margaret L. Johnson, “Biometric and the Threat to Civil 
Liberties”, Computer, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 2004, pp. 90-91. 
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fingerprints and vehicle registration information, it intends to make available the following 
types of information: ballistics, telephone numbers and other communications data, with the 
exclusion of content data and traffic data unless the latter data are controlled by the designated 
authority, and minimum data for the identification of persons contained in civil registers. Unlike 
the proposal for a Council Framework Decision, the Convention does not “entail any obligation 
to collect and store information…for the sole purpose of making it available to the competent 
authorities of other Member States.”
42 Rather, it stipulates that “where, in ongoing investigation 
or criminal proceedings, there is no DNA profile available for a particular individual present 
within a requested Contracting Party’s territory, the requested Contracting Party shall provide 
legal assistance by collecting and examining cellular material from that individual and by 
supplying DNA profile obtained” to the requesting state.
43 The table in the annex presents a 
comparison between the Prüm Convention and Framework Decisions 2005/490 and 2005/475. 
Our purpose in offering this table is not to set up a comprehensive map of data exchange and 
data protection in the EU, but rather to draw a contrasted picture of provisions in these fields. 
Prüm introduces some safeguards for the transferring of data collected. Art. 2.2 provides that 
“reference data shall only include DNA profiles established from the non-coding part of DNA 
and a reference. Reference data must not contain data from which data subject can be directly 
identified.” Further, “the data subject shall be entitled to have inaccurate data corrected and 
unlawfully processed data deleted”. And, finally, “the Contracting Parties shall also ensure that, 
in the event of violation of his rights in relation to data protection, the data subject shall be able 
to lodge a complaint to an independent court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights or an independent supervisory authority within the 
meaning of Article 28 of Directive 95/46/EC”.
44 
Prüm amplifies the conventional wisdom in the security field that ‘more is better’ and that an 
increase in the number of databases increases security. However, insecurity is not acute because 
law enforcement authorities do not share enough information, but rather because they share it 
badly and in a multiplicity of different fora. This, in turn, generates concern about the omission 
of any reference to other existing databases and the lack of any indication of the extent to which, 
if any, synergies will be established between data collected by NCPs of Prüm on the one hand, 
and data gathered by EURODAC (system for the comparison of fingerprints of asylum 
applicants), the Visa Information System (VIS) and the Schengen Information System (SIS II), 
on the other hand. If the forthcoming Communication on enhanced synergies between SIS II, 
VIS and EURODAC (expected in 2006) is successfully applied, the database landscape of the 
EU will find itself split between two logics.
45 Taken individually, these two groups of databases 
do not seem qualitatively different. Taken together, however, they will create new patterns of 
action, which will inevitably overlap and eventually duplicate each other. 
                                                 
42 COM (2005)490 final, Art. 2(2). 
43 Art. 7. 
44 Art. 40(1). 
45 See the annex to the Commission’s Communication on the Hague Programme, COM(2005) 184 final, 
Brussels, 10.05.2005. See also the Commission’s Communication on the development of the Schengen 
Information System II and possible synergy with a future Visa Information System, COM(2003) 771 
final, Brussels, 11.12.2003, point 1.2.2. See also Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among 
European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, COM (2005) 597 final, Brussels, 24.11.2005. SECURITY AND THE TWO-LEVEL GAME | 15 
 
5.  Rethinking Schengen Continuity and Transformation 
The Treaty of Prüm bears the marks of Schengen. Notice that all of the signatory states have 
participated both in the Schengen Agreement 1985 and the Schengen Implementing Agreement 
1990 and played a central role in intergovernmental cooperation in fields of central interest and 
importance to the EU. Notice, too, that signatories are participants in the decision taken in 1997 
in the context of the intergovernmental conference which led to the Amsterdam Treaty which 
inserted the Schengen acquis into the EC/EU treaties. Prüm, then, is a new form of the 
‘Schengen’ process.
46 
The preceding comments suggest that in examining the method of Prüm, it is important to be 
clear about the dynamics of Schengen. The major objective of Schengen was the abolition of all 
border checks across Europe. The context was, however, dominated by the fear that such sub-
Union agreements could institutionalise a Europe of ‘variable geometry’.
47 To reduce these 
concerns, Schengen members therefore framed the Convention as a ‘laboratory’ for Europe, the 
goal of which was, they claimed, to push European integration forward.
48  
However, the idea of Schengen as a ‘laboratory’ is not easy to endorse.
49 In fact, the reluctance 
of the EU Member States to be bound by ‘hard’ EU law in the abolition of intra-Member State 
border controls led to the creation of the Schengen regime through intergovernmental 
agreements outside EU law. Notwithstanding the Member States express commitment in the 
Single European Act of 1986 to undertake the dismantling of border controls among themselves 
within the EC Treaty, they refused to do so and kept the process in a weaker legal framework. 
This process of distortion of the internal market was described by the officials promoting the 
mechanism of Schengen as a ‘laboratory’. One actor’s attempt to legitimise the process is 
Charles Elsen. He states: “The Schengen founders would have not worked in vain, but they 
would have showed a possible and feasible way, set up a laboratory for Europe and, thus, given 
a remarkable push forward to the construction of Europe.”
50 The Commission effectively 
                                                 
46 That is why Prüm is also called ‘Schengen III’. 
47 A. Stubb, Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and beyond, London: 
Palgrave, 2002; A. Wiener, “Forging Flexibility: The British ‘No’ to Schengen”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1999.  
48 See Ruben Zaiotti, “Revisiting Schengen: Europe and the Emergence of a New Culture of Border 
Control”, paper presented at the 46
th Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), 
Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-5 March 2005.  
49 The debate is premised on the question of whether the idea of ‘laboratory’ was arrived at ex ante or ex 
post. The first position is shared by almost all of the contributors to the volume published by the College 
of Europe, entitled Integrated Security in Europe: A Democratic Perspective, Collegium-News of the 
College of Europe/Nouvelles du Collège de l’Europe, No. 22-XII.2001. Didier Bigo, by contrast, posits 
that Schengen was not construed by signatories as a ‘laboratory’, at least not at the beginning of the 
process: “Nobody has clearly discussed what was the debate of the eighties and how these norms were set 
up.” He continues: “Very often the propaganda of a Schengen laboratory in advance, in regards to the 
natural evolution of the EU, was considered as sufficient, but a more critical look shows that Schengen 
logic was clearly against freedom of movement of people and was conducted not only by fears about 
criminals but also about migrants, foreigners from third world countries.” See Didier Bigo, “Frontiers 
Control in Europe: Who is in Control?”, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: 
Free Movement into and within Europe, London: Ashgate, pp. 66-67. See also Didier Bigo and Elspeth 
Guild, “La mise à l’écart des étrangers. La logique du VISA Schengen”, Cultures & Conflits: Sociologie 
politique de l’international, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003. 
50 Our translation. In French: “Les bâtisseurs de Schengen n’auront pas travaillé en vain, mais ils auront 
montré une voie possible et realisable, crée un laboratoire d’essai pour l’Europe et, en définitive, donné 
un formidable coup de main à la construction européenne.” Charles Elsen, quoted in W. van der Rijt, “Le 
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echoed this idea of Schengen as a laboratory, which emerged most strongly in Jacques Delors’ 
response to a written question on that issue: “The solutions arrived at by the Schengen group are 
an inspiration to Community bodies.”
51 This support is hard to understand. One would not 
expect the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ to confer legitimacy to an initiative that, in many respects, 
challenges its authority.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam nonetheless confirmed this process by appending a Protocol on 
Schengen to the EC and EU Treaties.
52 Art. 8 of the Protocol provides that the Schengen acquis 
must be accepted in full by all candidates for admission.
53 In other words, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam creates the possibility for a limited number of Member States to coordinate their 
activities on specific issue within the limits of what is called ‘enhanced cooperation’. As for 
Schengen, the results of enhanced cooperation have become binding for all state candidates for 
admission.  
Prüm starts off with seven members, five of which were Schengen initial signatories. Like 
Schengen, it excludes Italy. Unlike Schengen, France is not one of the central actors; Austria 
and Germany are. Indeed, Otto Schily, the former German Ministry of Interior, admitted that 
France and Spain joined the Treaty at the very last minute. “Because of its importance for future 
cross-border cooperation in preventing and prosecuting crime,” he said, “I am especially pleased 
that France and Spain were also willing to sign the agreement at such short notice.”
54 Further, 
like Schengen, its avowed aim is to play a pioneering role in the integration of the EU. 
Moreover, the exchange of information was also a key factor of the Schengen Convention 
signed on 14 June 1985.
55 Finally, in line with the spirit of Schengen acquis, Prüm leaves open 
the possibility for the remaining 18 Member States to adhere to its rules and practices. This last 
point may turn out to be impracticable for two reasons. First, Prüm is just one Member State 
short of the number specified in the EU Treaty as necessary to trigger the provisions on 
enhanced cooperation. In addition, enhanced cooperation would have required an approval by a 
qualified majority in the Council of Ministers, and the EU Commission would have had to 
assess whether Prüm is compatible with other institutions governing the EU. Yet, even if these 
conditions were met, there will still be no guarantee that the provisions defended by Prüm will 
be integrated in the Union as such. In fact, under the terms of the Treaty of Nice ratified in 
2003, acts and decisions resulting from enhanced cooperation “shall not form part of the Union 
acquis.”
56 
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Information Systems, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1998, p. 65.  
51 Reply to Written Question 2668/90, O.J. C144/11. 
52 See Eric Philippart, Optimising the Mechanism for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ within the EU: 
Recommendations for the Constitutional Treaty, CEPS Policy Brief No. 33, CEPS, Brussels, May 2003. 
53 See Didier Bigo, “Frontiers Control in the European Union: Who is in Control?”, op. cit. 
54 “Simplified cross-border cooperation: 7-country agreement signed” (retrieved on 6 December 2005 
from http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_148134/Internet/Content/Nachrichten/Archiv/Presse 
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55 See Art. 46 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. 22.9.2000 19 Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 
56 TEU, Art. 44, §1. See also Arts. 43 and 45. For an assessment of enhanced cooperation after the Treaty 
of Nice, see Bribosa Hervé, “Les coopérations renforcées au lendemain du traité de Nice”, Revue du Droit 
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However, there are signs that the Prüm Convention may follow a similar evolution as that of 
Schengen, albeit with variations in membership. First, Britain is considering seriously whether it 
should join the Treaty. Second, the Commission has made references to Prüm as not 
constituting an obstacle. For instance, the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and 
synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs views Prüm as a 
mechanism to reduce the shortcomings in the exchange of data among Member States..
57 Third, 
the European Parliament has not raised its voice on this issue. 
The foregoing discussion reveals a vortex of ambiguities which, in turn, raises the question of 
the benefit of the Convention for the evolution of the EU as a whole. It also seems that Prüm 
has prompted a race with other EU institutions, for instance, on the nature and speed of data 
exchanges. Moreover, if the time required before Schengen became actually operational can be 
taken as a norm (some 10 years), Prüm may be outdated before it enters into force, rolling 
ratification notwithstanding. And if it succeeded, it will have to overcome an additional hurdle: 
to prove that its decisions and structures could benefit all EU members and that they do not 
conflict with other EU institutions in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
6. Conclusions 
The Treaty of Prüm undermines the EU’s ability to become an efficient policy-making body in 
the field of security. To start with, by setting up exclusive and competitive measures that seek to 
address threats that affect the EU as a whole, it blurs the coherence of EU action in these fields. 
Second, by developing new mechanisms of security that operate above and below the EU level, 
it dismantles trust among Member States. Finally, by establishing a framework whose rules are 
not subject to Parliamentary oversight, the Convention impacts on the EU principle of 
transparency. These three principles – trust, coherency and transparency – are yardsticks against 
which Prüm should be assessed.  
The necessity of coherence. The provisions contained in Prüm, mainly as regards irregular 
migration, are incoherent. As measures that exclude third country nationals from access to the 
EU territory, they engage only seven of the 12 Schengen states within whose territory there is 
free movement of persons; thus third country nationals arriving in the EU via the five non-Prüm 
members avoid the extra controls of the Prüm states but have access to the territory of the Prüm 
states in any event. By the same token, members of Prüm have decided to set up a “technical 
group focusing on return issues [which] would be co-ordinated by France”.
58 Yet, how this 
group will work is not clear. For instance, would it operate in accordance with the rules set out 
by the Council Decision 2004/573/EC and by COM(2005) 391? More fundamentally, would it 
work under the supervision of or in parallel with the foreseen Special Representative for a 
common readmission policy?
59  
                                                 
57 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improved 
effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice 
and Home Affairs, COM (2005) 597 final, Brussels, 24.11.2005. 
58 Council of the European Union, “Outcome of Proceedings”, 12656/05, Brussels, 27 September 2005. 
59 Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for the removals 
from territory of two or more Member States, of third-country national who are subjects of individual 
removal orders, OJ L 261/28, 6.8.2004. On the appointment of a Special Representative for a common 
readmission policy, see the Presidency Conclusion of the Brussels European Council, 4-5 November 
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The necessity of trust. As Niklas Luhman puts it, trust is the basis of cooperation.
60 Prüm 
provides a framework for the privileged group of seven State signatories to come to a 
multilateral agreement on key policies that have been the subject of divergent positions among 
the rest of the Member States. Each chapter of the Convention includes highly debated and 
sensitive initiatives, whose agreement inside the Council would have been difficult. This is even 
more acute taking into account that according to Art. 34 TEU, the unanimity rule continues to 
apply inside the Council of Ministers as regards third pillar-related measures. In short, the 
provisions developed by the Convention are negative factors to the democratic and judicial 
institutions of the EU since they exclude them from the development of the EU acquis. 
The necessity of transparency. Opening an interparliamentary assembly, European Parliament 
President Josep Borrell acknowledged that he had never heard of the Prüm Treaty.
61 This is 
revealing of the way the Convention was negotiated and signed, that is, without any 
Parliamentary oversight. Accordingly, the European Parliament has recently proposed to move 
judicial cooperation on criminal matters and police to Community competence (first pillar) in 
order to improve transparency. This proposal should be strengthened and supported if security 
measures are to have any legitimacy.  
The intergovernmental nature of cooperation in the field of security in the EU inhibits 
‘democratic check’ where a treaty is presented, already negotiated for ratification or rejection 
and changes are not permitted. In this sense, we could argue that Prüm ignores the European 
Parliament just at a time when it is achieving a more central role in law-making in this field, as 
called for in the provisions of the EU Treaty. It will undoubtedly be a vexing experience for the 
European Parliament to see the value of its power to participate in law-making in the area 
diminished as the field over which it is to provide oversight is moved into an intergovernmental 
venue.  
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice is excluded at least in so far as the measures 
adopted under Prüm will not be subject to its jurisdiction which is limited to EC/EU treaty 
provisions. The time may come when the European Court of Justice is requested to give 
judgment on the validity of measures taken under Prüm (or indeed the project itself) – an 
excluded Member State or an institutional actor could bring proceedings before the Court 
against the Prüm participants for failure to act in accordance with their treaty obligations – but 
the fruit of Prüm will not be justiciable before the ECJ unless and until it is inserted into the 
EU/EC treaties. As a result, the Treaty leads to less Europe and a reduced capacity in the field of 
freedom, security and justice. 
 
                                                 
60 See Niklas Luhman, Trust and Power, London: John Wiley, 1979.  
61 Josep Borrell Fontelles, Opening Speech by the President of the European Parliament, , Parliamentary 
Meeting at the initiative of the European Parliament and the UK Parliament on “Liberty and Security: 
Improving Parliamentary Scrutiny of Judicial and Police Cooperation in Europe,” Brussels, 17 October 
2005.  
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Annex 
Comparison between the Prüm Convention 
and Framework Decisions 2005/1270 and 2005/1241 
Title  Nature of data  Data protection 
initiative 
Who controls 
the data 
Who accesses/processes 
the data 
Prüm Convention  DNA analysis (Art. 2) 
Fingerprint data (Art. 8) 
Vehicle registration data 
(Art. 12) 
Non-personal and personal 
data supplied in connec-
tion with major events 
(Arts. 13-15) 
Contracting 
Parties (Art. 34) 
Contracting 
Parties via 
their national 
contact points 
(Art. 4) 
Contracting Parties’ 
national contact points 
(Art. 3). Indirect access 
regime. 
Council 
Framework 
Decision on the 
exchange of 
information under 
the principle of 
availability 
{SEC(2005)1270} 
Annex 2 
DNA profiles 
Fingerprint 
Ballistics 
Vehicle registration 
information  
Telephone numbers and 
other communications 
data 
Minimum data for the 
identification of persons 
contained in civil registers 
Regulatory 
Committee 
established 
pursuant the 
Framework 
Decision (point 
9, preamble) 
Member 
States’ 
designated 
authorities or 
designated 
parties (Art. 4 
and Art. 8) 
Equivalent competent 
authorities (i.e. police, 
customs and other 
authorities of Member 
States) as well as 
Europol (Art. 6). Direct 
access regime is the 
principle. 
 
Council 
Framework 
Decision on the 
protection of 
personal data 
processed in the 
framework of 
police and judicial 
co-operation in 
criminal matters 
{SEC(2005)1241} 
Personal data, i.e. any 
information relating to an 
identified or identifiable 
natural person (Art. 2)
a 
Member States’ 
supervisory 
authorities (Art. 
30) 
Working Party 
on the protection 
of individuals 
with regard to 
the processing 
of personal data 
(Arts. 31-32) 
[Advisory 
status] 
Member 
States (Art. 9, 
Arts. 19-26) 
Member States’ 
competent authorities 
(Arts. 8-12) 
Authorities other than 
competent authorities 
(Art. 13)
b  
Private parties (Art. 14)
c 
Authorities in third 
countries or 
International bodies 
(Art. 15)
d 
 
a Special categories of data, only if the two conditions of Art. 6, paragraph 2 apply. 
b Only if the conditions indicated in Art. 13 are met. 
c Only if the conditions indicated in Art. 14 are met. 
d Only if the conditions indicated in Art. 15 are met.  
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